How Did the World Get Rich?
The Great Enrichment, and the soil it grew in
Start Here: The Hockey Stick
For almost all of human history, most people lived close to bare survival. Kings and merchants rose and fell, and good harvests came and went, but the typical person’s standard of living barely changed from one century to the next. Then, beginning in northwestern Europe around 1800, something new happened: incomes began rising and kept rising. Plotted over time, average income looks like a hockey stick, flat for millennia and then shooting upward.
WATCH Puzzle of Growth: Rich Countries and Poor Countries (Marginal Revolution University)
Life Before the Upswing
Many people picture life before factories as simpler and gentler: quiet villages, food straight from the farm, clean air, and no smokestacks. The records that historians and demographers have pieced together tell a different story. On the flat part of the hockey stick, ordinary life was short, hungry, and hard.
The table compares the world around 1800 with the world today.
| Measure | Around 1800 | Today |
|---|---|---|
| Children who died before age 15 | About 4 in 10 in Sweden and France (1750–80) | About 1 in 25 worldwide |
| Life expectancy at birth | Under 40 years in every world region | 73 years worldwide (2023) |
| Adults who could read | About 1 in 10 (1820) | Almost 9 in 10 |
| People living in extreme poverty | About 3 in 4 (1820) | About 1 in 10 |
Figures are from Our World in Data, which compiles estimates from historians and demographers with recent data from the United Nations and the World Bank.
What the averages hide. Averages can mislead. Life expectancy was low largely because so many children died, not because adults typically died at 30 or 40. In France in 1816, a 15-year-old could expect to live to about 58; today, a French 15-year-old can expect to reach 83. Death rates have fallen at every age, not only in childhood.
Daily life. Numbers can make the past feel abstract. Chelsea Follett, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, tries to make it concrete in her 2026 book The Grim Old Days: An Introduction to the Preindustrial Past, built on firsthand accounts. She describes most people living on thin gruel and coarse bread, often stale or contaminated, with food shortages regularly setting off riots. Work ran from sunup to sundown, and homes filled with smoke from the hearth. Medicine often did more harm than good: surgery came with no anesthesia beyond alcohol, and bloodletting was the standard treatment for almost any illness. “Even lighting,” she writes, “was once a luxury that most ordinary households went without after nightfall.”
Why it stayed flat. Why did the stick stay flat for so long? Thomas Malthus offered an answer in 1798. When harvests improved or a new tool raised output, more children survived and families grew. Because land was fixed, each extra worker added less, and income per person slid back toward subsistence. Economists call this the Malthusian trap: growth in total output was matched by growth in population, so the typical person was no better off. The rest of this reading asks what finally broke the trap.
A long debate. Historians have argued for nearly two centuries about whether the first decades of industry made ordinary workers better off. Friedrich Engels’s 1845 account of Manchester and other English factory towns described crowded, filthy slums. Economic historian Charles Feinstein estimated that the living standard of the average British working-class family rose by less than 15 percent between the 1780s and the 1850s. Robert Allen calls this stretch, when output per worker grew but real wages stalled, “Engels’ pause.” After about 1850, wages began rising along with productivity. Both things can be true: preindustrial life was grim, and the early industrial era brought crowded cities and gains that took two generations to reach most workers.
And about the future. A related debate looks forward. Degrowth writers, such as economic anthropologist Jason Hickel in Less Is More (2020), argue that rich countries no longer need economic growth and should cut their use of energy and materials while sharing more fairly what they already have. Follett wrote her book partly as an answer to that view, arguing that a romantic picture of the past leads people to undervalue growth. The Normative Question at the end of this reading asks you to weigh these.
What Growth Buys shows that many of the same gaps still exist today, between rich countries and poor ones.
READ The Preindustrial Past Was a Horror Story (Chelsea Follett, HumanProgress, Cato Institute, October 2026)
What Growth Buys
Our World in Data, a research project based at the University of Oxford, publishes hundreds of charts that set average income beside other things people care about. The pattern is hard to miss: on almost every measure of health, comfort, and opportunity, people in richer countries do better. The World Bank’s figures for its four income groups show the same thing.
| Measure | Low income | Lower-middle | Upper-middle | High income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income per person (2025) | $2,500 | $9,400 | $21,700 | $59,600 |
| Life expectancy at birth | 65 years | 70 years | 76 years | 80 years |
| Children who die before age 5 | 1 in 15 | 1 in 23 | 1 in 76 | 1 in 196 |
| People with electricity | 49% | 91% | 99% | 100% |
| People with basic drinking water | 60% | 91% | 96% | 99% |
| CO₂ emissions per person | 0.3 tons | 1.6 tons | 6.4 tons | 9.8 tons |
Income is measured at purchasing power parity in 2021 dollars, which adjusts for differences in living costs. Other figures are for 2024.
WATCH 200 Countries, 200 Years, 4 Minutes (Hans Rosling, BBC)
Soil, Climate, and Seeds
One useful way to sort the answers is to think of a garden. Nothing grows without good soil, but soil alone doesn’t make a garden.
- The soil: institutions. The rules of the game, such as property rights, contracts, courts, and limits on rulers. Douglass North.
- The climate: ideas about people. Whether a society honors or scorns ordinary people who try new things. Deirdre McCloskey.
- The seeds: useful knowledge. Knowing how things work and putting that knowledge to use. Joel Mokyr.
The three overlap, and the thinkers themselves disagree about which matters most.
Three Thinkers, Three Layers
1 Douglass North: The rules of the game
Nobel economist Douglass North defined institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.” They include formal rules, such as constitutions, laws, and property rights, and informal ones, such as customs and codes of conduct. Good rules lower the cost and risk of trading with strangers, so people will specialize, invest, and make deals they could not make otherwise. North found that secure property rights were a prerequisite for growth in Western Europe. England and the Netherlands, where property was secure and restrictive guilds were weak, pulled ahead. Spain, which lacked such changes, stagnated for a century.
The challenge. Rules are slow to change, so why did growth explode when it did? England had courts and fairly secure property for centuries before 1800. McCloskey argues that the timing doesn’t fit and that institutions only work when people believe in them. North’s own definition, which includes customs and codes of conduct, partly answers this.
2 Deirdre McCloskey: Dignity and liberty
McCloskey argues that the Great Enrichment came from a change in ideas. “Our riches,” she writes, “were made not by piling brick on brick, bank balance on bank balance, but by piling idea on idea.” Starting in Holland and Britain, ordinary people such as barbers, clockmakers, and shopkeepers gained the liberty to try new things and, just as important, the dignity of being admired for it. She calls the result the Bourgeois Deal. Act 1: let me try out my idea and keep the profits if it works. Act 2: don’t envy those profits, because you chose to buy what I made. Act 3: by the end, you will all be better off too. Saving and investment were needed, she says, but they had always existed. What was new was the honor given to innovation.
The challenge. Ideas and attitudes are hard to measure, so critics ask how the theory could be tested. Did respect for commerce come first, or did it follow wealth? Others note that the same centuries that celebrated free commerce also saw slavery and colonial rule, so liberty and dignity were far from extended to everyone.
3 Joel Mokyr: Useful knowledge and a culture of growth
Economic historian Joel Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Prize for identifying the prerequisites for sustained growth through technological progress. Earlier societies produced brilliant inventions, but the gains fizzled out. Mokyr argues that people often knew that something worked but not why. Once the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment connected the two kinds of knowledge, each fed the other: science improved tools, and better tools improved science. Europe’s many competing states created a “market for ideas.” A thinker banned in one country could publish in another, and a cross-border “Republic of Letters” shared findings. Britain also had skilled craftsmen who could turn designs into working machines. Finally, growth needs a society open to change, because new technology always creates losers who want to block it.
The challenge. If the knowledge spread across Europe, why did the breakthrough come first in Britain rather than in France or the Netherlands? Some historians reply that ideas were everywhere but it paid to use them only in certain places.
WATCH What Caused the Industrial Revolution? and The Economics of Ideas (Marginal Revolution University)
Fair Challenges: Other Explanations
- Prices and geography (Robert Allen). In 18th-century Britain, wages were high and coal was cheap. Machines that replaced workers with coal power paid off there but not in low-wage countries, so Britain had the strongest reason to invent them.
- Coal and colonies (Kenneth Pomeranz). As late as 1750, the richest parts of China and Europe had similar living standards. Europe pulled ahead, he argues, partly through luck: coal close to its cities, and colonies in the Americas that supplied cotton, sugar, and timber, much of it produced by enslaved workers. Critics ask whether coal and colonies were causes or mainly helpers, since coal became valuable only once new technology could use it.
- Inclusive vs. extractive institutions (Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson). Their research, which shared the 2024 Nobel Prize, finds that where colonizers set up rules to extract resources, the harm often lasted for centuries, and some once-rich regions are now poor. This view joins North’s soil to the critics’ concern about conquest.
- The gaps it opened (Angus Deaton). The “great escape” from poverty and early death started in a few places, so the world grew healthier and wealthier but also more unequal between nations. The task now is helping the rest escape.
Notice what can and can’t be settled by evidence. How much colonial trade added to Britain’s income is an empirical question. Whether wealth built partly on injustice is tainted, and what is owed today, are questions of values.
A Clue from the Job Records
Many people picture the Industrial Revolution as the moment workers left farms for factories. A long-running Cambridge University project on British jobs tells a different story. Its historians pieced together the occupations listed in wills, estate records, and baptism registers, more than two million documents in all. They found that the share of men in England and Wales who made things, in crafts, manufacturing, and construction, rose from about 30 percent in 1601 to about 43 percent in 1701. Then it barely moved for 150 years: it was about 46 percent in 1851. When workers did leave farming after about 1820, most went into services such as transport, shops, and offices, not into factories.
So what changed during the Industrial Revolution was mainly how much each worker produced, not where people worked. That doesn’t settle which explanation above is right, because new ideas, cheap coal, and better rules could each raise output per worker. It does sharpen the question: what made workers so much more productive after about 1800? A caution: before 1817 the estimates cover men only, and they are rebuilt from incomplete records, so the exact numbers may change as the research continues.
One Question, Several Answers
Why did sustained growth begin in Britain around 1800?
| Thinker | Main answer | Lesson for poor countries today |
|---|---|---|
| North | Secure property rights and the rule of law | Build trustworthy rules and courts |
| McCloskey | New respect for ordinary people who innovate | Honor and free up enterprise, not just copy laws |
| Mokyr | Useful knowledge and openness to change | Spread knowledge and let new ideas compete |
| Allen | High wages and cheap coal made machines pay | Growth follows prices and opportunities |
| Pomeranz | Lucky coal deposits and colonial resources | Britain’s path may be hard to repeat |
| Acemoglu and Robinson | Inclusive rather than extractive institutions | Spread power so elites can’t block change |
What Economics Adds
LISTEN The Hidden Cause of the Industrial Revolution (with Ben Southwood) and Can a Nation Plunder Its Way to Wealth (with Noah Smith) on EconTalk, hosted by Russ Roberts, with transcripts
The Normative Question
Evidence can tell us how much the world has grown and test which causes mattered most. It cannot tell us how to weigh growth against what it disrupts: old jobs, familiar towns, and the natural environment. Is the Great Enrichment, on balance, the best thing that has happened to ordinary people, or does it leave too much damage behind? What, if anything, do the people who gain from creative destruction owe to those who lose? And if you were advising a poor country today, would you start with the rules, the ideas, or the knowledge?
Key Terms in Plain Words
- Great Enrichment
- McCloskey’s name for the sustained rise in living standards since about 1800.
- Institutions
- The formal and informal rules of the game that shape how people interact.
- Property rights
- Secure, enforceable claims to own, use, and trade what you have.
- Rule of law
- Rules that apply to everyone, including rulers, and are enforced fairly.
- Bourgeois Deal
- McCloskey’s bargain: let me innovate and profit, and everyone ends up richer.
- Useful knowledge
- Mokyr’s term for knowing both how things work and how to make them.
- Market for ideas
- Competition among thinkers that tests ideas and spreads the best ones.
- Creative destruction
- Growth through new products and firms replacing older ones.
- Inclusive institutions
- Rules that let most people take part and share in the gains.
- Extractive institutions
- Rules that let a small elite take wealth from everyone else.
- Preston curve
- The link between national income and life expectancy, which has shifted up over time.
- Easterlin paradox
- The finding that average happiness may not rise over time as countries grow richer.
- Malthusian trap
- A pattern in which gains in output are absorbed by population growth, keeping incomes near subsistence.
- Standard-of-living debate
- Historians’ long argument over whether early industry made ordinary workers better off.
Sources
- Quotations, figures, examples, videos, and podcasts in this sheet come from the sources below.
- How Recent Is It?
- University of Groningen, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, “The Maddison Project: New 2023 Update Illuminates Origins of Modern Economic Growth.” rug.nl
- University of Groningen, Maddison Project Database 2023 rug.nl
- World Bank, “A Century of Extreme Poverty: Five Facts from 1950 to 2050.” blogs.worldbank.org
- World Bank, Poverty, Prosperity, and Planet Report 2026 worldbank.org
- Life Before The Upswing
- Our World in Data, “Mortality in the Past: Every Second Child Died.” ourworldindata.org
- Our World in Data, “Life Expectancy” (including life expectancy at age 15 in France since 1816) ourworldindata.org
- Our World in Data, “Life Expectancy” (long-run data, Riley 2005 and UN World Population Prospects) ourworldindata.org
- Our World in Data, “Two Centuries Ago, Only 1 in 10 Adults Could Read. Today, It’s Almost 9 in 10.” ourworldindata.org
- Our World in Data, “Extreme Poverty: How Far Have We Come, and How Far Do We Still Have to Go?” ourworldindata.org
- Anthony A. Volk and Jeremy A. Atkinson, “Infant and Child Death in the Human Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation,” Evolution and Human Behavior 34, no. 3 (2013) hraf.yale.edu
- Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), Library of Economics and Liberty edition econlib.org
- Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, “The Stages of Economic Growth Revisited, Part 1” (the Malthusian trap), 2016 minneapolisfed.org
- Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844 (1845), Project Gutenberg edition gutenberg.org
- Charles H. Feinstein, “Pessimism Perpetuated: Real Wages and the Standard of Living in Britain during and after the Industrial Revolution,” Journal of Economic History 58, no. 3 (1998) jstor.org
- Robert C. Allen, “Engels’ Pause: Technical Change, Capital Accumulation, and Inequality in the British Industrial Revolution,” Explorations in Economic History 46, no. 4 (2009) econpapers.repec.org
- Chelsea Follett, The Grim Old Days: An Introduction to the Preindustrial Past, Cato Institute, 2026 (argument) cato.org
- Chelsea Follett, “The Preindustrial Past Was a Horror Story,” HumanProgress, October 23, 2026 (argument) humanprogress.org
- Chelsea Follett, “The Preindustrial Past Offers a Warning for Today’s Policymakers,” Independent Women, October 20, 2026 (argument) independentwomen.com
- Jason Hickel, Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World, Penguin Random House, 2020 (argument) penguin.co.uk
- What Growth Buys
- World Bank, World Development Indicators: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2021 international $) data.worldbank.org
- World Bank, World Development Indicators: Life expectancy at birth data.worldbank.org
- World Bank, World Development Indicators: Mortality rate, under-5 data.worldbank.org
- World Bank, World Development Indicators: Access to electricity data.worldbank.org
- World Bank, World Development Indicators: People using at least basic drinking water services data.worldbank.org
- World Bank, World Development Indicators: Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per capita data.worldbank.org
- Samuel H. Preston, “The Changing Relation between Mortality and Level of Economic Development,” Population Studies 29, no. 2 (1975), reprinted in Bulletin of the World Health Organization 81, no. 11 (2003) pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Richard A. Easterlin and others, “The Happiness–Income Paradox Revisited,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 52 (2010) pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, “Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2008) brookings.edu
- Angus Deaton, “Income, Health, and Well-Being around the World: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 2 (2008) aeaweb.org
- Our World in Data, “Life Expectancy vs. GDP per Capita” (interactive chart) ourworldindata.org
- Our World in Data, “Self-Reported Life Satisfaction vs. GDP per Capita” (interactive chart) ourworldindata.org
- Douglass North
- Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112 aeaweb.org
- The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, press release on the 1993 Prize in Economic Sciences to Robert Fogel and Douglass North nobelprize.org
- Deirdre Mccloskey
- Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World, University of Chicago Press, 2016 press.uchicago.edu
- Deirdre Nansen McCloskey and Art Carden, Leave Me Alone and I’ll Make You Rich: How the Bourgeois Deal Enriched the World, University of Chicago Press, 2020 press.uchicago.edu
- Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, “The Great Enrichment: A Humanistic and Social Scientific Account,” Social Science History cambridge.org
- Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, “Max U versus Humanomics: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalism,” Journal of Institutional Economics cambridge.org
- Joel Mokyr, And Aghion And Howitt
- The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, press release on the 2025 Prize in Economic Sciences nobelprize.org
- The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, popular information on the 2025 Prize in Economic Sciences nobelprize.org
- Joel Mokyr, A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy, Princeton University Press, 2016 press.princeton.edu
- Other Explanations
- Robert C. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2009 cambridge.org
- Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton University Press, 2000 press.princeton.edu
- Peer Vries, “Are Coal and Colonies Really Crucial? Kenneth Pomeranz and the Great Divergence,” Journal of World History 12, no. 2 (2001) bpb-us-e2.wpmucdn.com
- The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, press release on the 2024 Prize in Economic Sciences to Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson nobelprize.org
- Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality, Princeton University Press, 2013 press.princeton.edu
- A Clue From The Job Records
- Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, “When Did England and Wales Industrialise?” 2025 campop.geog.cam.ac.uk
- Leigh Shaw-Taylor, “The Occupational Structure of Britain c.1379–1911,” Economic History Society blog ehs.org.uk
- Occupational Structure of Britain project, “The Occupational Structure of Britain c.1379–1911 and the International Comparative History of Occupational Structure: An Overview of Findings and Where to Find Them,” University of Cambridge, 2019 campop.geog.cam.ac.uk
- University of Cambridge, Occupational Structure of Britain project, publication plans and paper abstracts campop.geog.cam.ac.uk
- Sebastian A. J. Keibek, “The Male Occupational Structure of England and Wales, 1600–1850,” PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2017 repository.cam.ac.uk
- Videos (Marginal Revolution University, YouTube)
- Alex Tabarrok, “Puzzle of Growth: Rich Countries and Poor Countries” youtube.com
- Marginal Revolution University, “What Caused the Industrial Revolution?” youtube.com
- Alex Tabarrok, “The Economics of Ideas” youtube.com
- Other Videos (YouTube)
- Hans Rosling, “200 Countries, 200 Years, 4 Minutes,” The Joy of Stats, BBC, 2010 youtube.com
- Podcasts (Econtalk, Library Of Economics And Liberty, With Transcripts)
- EconTalk, “The Hidden Cause of the Industrial Revolution (with Ben Southwood),” hosted by Russ Roberts, August 17, 2026 econtalk.org
- EconTalk, “Can a Nation Plunder Its Way to Wealth (with Noah Smith),” hosted by Russ Roberts, January 15, 2024 econtalk.org