Should We Bring Manufacturing Home?
How trade works, where the factory jobs went, who pays for tariffs, and when depending on other countries is a real risk
How Trade Works
“Build it here, bring the jobs home, and stop depending on other countries” is an appealing idea, and people on the left and the right both make it. To test it, start with how economists describe a market economy.
Trade is the same deal across a border. You don’t grow your own food or build your own car. You specialize in what you do well, sell it, and buy the rest. Countries gain the same way: each does best by making what it gives up the least to make, its comparative advantage, and trading for the rest. A country can depend on others the way you depend on your grocery store. The useful question is not “Are we dependent?” but “Dependent on whom, for what, and with what backup?”
Work through five questions whenever someone proposes bringing production home:
| The Reshoring Checklist | What to look for | In the factory debate |
|---|---|---|
| 1. The goal. Is it more jobs, more output, or more security? | Each goal calls for a different policy, and one can work against another | Factories that add output with robots add few jobs |
| 2. The cause. What actually changed? | Productivity growth, foreign competition, and changes in what people buy | Output doubled since 1979 while factory jobs fell |
| 3. Seen and unseen. Who gains, and who pays? | Benefits that are easy to see; costs spread across many buyers | Jobs saved at a steel mill; higher costs for everyone who buys steel |
| 4. Inputs. Is the import a finished good or a part? | Imported materials, parts, and machines used by U.S. producers | U.S. automakers and machinery makers buy imported steel and parts |
| 5. Responses. What do others do next? | Retaliation by other countries; shifts by firms and buyers | Other countries’ tariffs on U.S. farm goods and factory exports |
Start Here: What Changed?
Factory jobs peaked in 1979. Compare that year with today:
| Measure | Then | Now | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. manufacturing jobs | 19.6 million (1979) | 12.7 million (2026) | down about 35% |
| Share of all U.S. jobs | 22% (1979) | 8% (2026) | down about two-thirds |
| U.S. factory output (index) | 47.6 (1979) | 99.4 (2026) | about doubled |
| Output per factory worker | 1.0 (1979 = base) | 3.2× (2026) | more than tripled |
| U.S. share of world manufacturing | about 25% (1995) | 15% (2023) | still second largest |
| China’s share of world manufacturing | 3% (1990) | 32% (2023) | now the largest |
Output index: 2017 = 100. Output per worker is the change in output divided by the change in jobs.
What changed, and what didn’t? America did not stop making things. U.S. factories produce about twice what they did in 1979, and the United States is still the world’s second-largest manufacturer. What fell was the number of workers it takes. Meanwhile, China grew from a small producer into the world’s largest.
Running the Checklist on Manufacturing
1 The goal: jobs, output, or security?
“Bring manufacturing home” can mean three different things, and they don’t always go together.
- More jobs. A modern factory uses far more machines per worker than one from 1979, so bringing production back adds fewer jobs than it once did. Factories already had 522,000 open jobs in August 2026, so for many employers the limit is finding trained workers, not finding work for them. A policy good for one goal may be poor for another.
- More output. Output is already near its record, about 1 percent higher in September 2026 than a year earlier.
- More security. Some goods matter for defense and emergencies. That goal is about specific products and reliable suppliers, not factory jobs in general.
2 The cause: where did the factory jobs go?
- Productivity. Better machines, software, and methods let each worker produce more. Since 1987, manufacturing productivity has grown about 2.1 percent a year. When output per worker rises faster than people buy more goods, fewer workers are needed.
- Trade, especially the “China shock.” After China joined the world trading system, imports surged. One major study estimates that competition from Chinese imports cost 2.0 to 2.4 million U.S. jobs from 1999 to 2011, counting spillovers to suppliers and local businesses. A 2022 correction to the study’s research design found the effect on factory jobs about half as large, though still significant. The economic historian Joseph Francis argues that, once that correction is fully applied, the study’s findings of harm to unemployment, labor force participation, wages, and household incomes disappear. He also argues that the local results can’t be scaled up to a national total. The original authors have been invited to reply, so treat this as a live debate. The losses were concentrated in particular towns and industries rather than spread evenly.
- What we buy. As people get richer, they spend a larger share of their income on services such as health care, education, and travel, and a smaller share on goods.
Notice the test. If trade alone explained the decline, output would have fallen with jobs. Instead it doubled. Trade explains a real part of the job losses after 2000 and where they landed; productivity explains most of the long decline. Both are true, and both matter.
3 Seen and unseen: do tariffs protect factory jobs?
A tariff is a tax on imports. It is the most common tool for bringing production home, and it produces two kinds of effects:
- The seen. After the 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs, U.S. steel imports fell 24 percent and U.S. steel production rose about 2 percent, adding about $1.3 billion in output.
- The unseen. Steel prices rose, and industries that use steel, such as autos and machinery, produced about $3.5 billion less. Federal Reserve economists found that the 2018–19 tariffs were linked to about 2.7 percent fewer manufacturing jobs overall: protection added a little, but higher input costs and other countries’ retaliation subtracted more.
- Who writes the check. Importers pay the tariff, and studies find that U.S. firms and consumers bore nearly all of it in 2018–19 and about 90 percent of it in 2025. Federal Reserve researchers estimate the 2025 tariffs raised prices of goods other than food and energy about 3.1 percent.
Manufacturing employment fell during 2025 as tariffs rose. It has been rising since December 2025, up 72,000 by September 2026.
4 Inputs: many imports feed U.S. factories
Many imports are not finished products for shoppers. They are parts, materials, and machines for American producers. In 2025, U.S. imports of capital goods, such as machinery and computers, reached a record $1.1 trillion. Census Bureau researchers estimate that about 60 percent of a typical manufacturer’s imports are inputs used in its own production. A tariff on those inputs raises the cost of making things in America, which is the opposite of the goal.
5 Responses: what happens next?
- Other countries retaliate. When the United States raises tariffs, trading partners often answer with their own tariffs on U.S. exports, including farm goods and manufactured products. Retaliation was one of the main reasons the 2018–19 tariffs cost manufacturing jobs.
- The trade deficit doesn’t simply shrink. The overall trade deficit reflects a gap between what Americans save and what they invest; when the U.S. invests more than it saves, foreign money fills the gap, and that money comes back as imports. In 2025 the average U.S. tariff rose from about 2.6 to 13 percent, yet the trade deficit was $901.5 billion, almost exactly the same as in 2024.
- The law responds, too. In February 2026 the Supreme Court ruled that an emergency-powers law does not authorize tariffs. Tariffs under other laws remain, including 50 percent on steel, aluminum, and copper.
WATCH Tariffs and Protectionism and Arguments Against International Trade (Marginal Revolution University)
What Can Government Do?
| Tool | How it works | The catch | What the evidence shows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Broad tariffs | Taxes imports to make foreign goods more expensive. | Raises costs for U.S. buyers and factories that use imports, and invites retaliation. | 2018–19 tariffs were linked to fewer factory jobs overall |
| Targeted subsidies | Pays firms to build in chosen industries, such as chips. | Taxpayers pay, and government must pick which industries and firms to support. | Can build capacity for goods tied to security; costly per job |
| Friend-shoring and stockpiles | Shifts supply to allies, lines up backup sources, and stores critical goods. | Allies are not always the cheapest suppliers, and storage costs money. | Spreads risk without making everything at home |
| Help displaced workers | Training, job search help, and income support for workers who lose jobs to trade. | Costs taxpayers and doesn’t save the old job. The federal program for trade-displaced workers stopped taking new workers in 2022. | Helps people, not particular jobs |
| Lower the cost of building here | Speeds permits, trains workers, and lowers energy and input costs. | Slow and unglamorous. U.S. factories had 522,000 open jobs in August 2026. | Helps every manufacturer, not a chosen few |
Fair Challenges
Decide what you think of each challenge first, then open the response.
“Tariffs protect American manufacturing jobs.”
“We can’t depend on rivals for things we need in a crisis.”
“China doesn’t play fair.”
“Government can pick the industries we need.”
“Trade wrecked whole towns.”
“A trade deficit means we’re losing.”
“Other countries pay the tariffs.”
“Factory jobs are better jobs.”
“It was robots, not trade.”
LISTEN The Economics of Tariffs and Trade (with Doug Irwin), Why Industrial Policy Is (Almost) Always a Bad Idea (with Scott Sumner), How Did America Build the Arsenal of Democracy? (with Brian Potter), and Revisiting the China Shock (with Joseph Francis) on EconTalk, hosted by Russ Roberts, with transcripts
The Normative Question
Economics can show what each policy does to prices, jobs, output, and risk. It can’t decide how much a society should pay for security, whether to protect particular jobs or help the people who hold them, or whether a stable factory town is worth higher prices for everyone else. Buying the cheapest goods leaves us more exposed to some risks; making more at home costs money and freedom of choice. Every choice, including doing nothing, puts the burden on someone.
Key Terms in Plain Words
- Specialization
- Focusing on what you do well and trading for the rest.
- Comparative advantage
- Being able to make something while giving up less than others would.
- Productivity
- How much a worker produces in an hour.
- Reshoring
- Bringing production back to the home country.
- Tariff
- A tax on imports, paid by the importer.
- Retaliation
- Another country’s tariffs in response to ours.
- Intermediate inputs
- Parts and materials used to make other goods.
- Friend-shoring
- Shifting supply to allied or friendly countries.
- Trade deficit
- Buying more from other countries than we sell to them.
- Saving–investment gap
- When a country invests more than it saves, which matches its trade deficit.
- China shock
- The surge of Chinese imports after 2001 and its effect on U.S. jobs.
- Industrial policy
- Government support aimed at growing particular industries.
Sources
- Figures in this sheet come from the sources below, current as of mid-October 2026.
- The Framework: Peter Boettke, George Mason University
- Peter J. Boettke, Rosolino A. Candela, and Tegan L. Truitt, The Socialist Calculation Debate: Theory, History, and Contemporary Relevance, Cambridge University Press, 2024 doi.org
- EconTalk, “Who Won the Socialist Calculation Debate (with Peter Boettke),” Library of Economics and Liberty, February 17, 2025 econtalk.org
- Start Here: What Changed
- Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Forty years of falling manufacturing employment,” Beyond the Numbers, 2020 bls.gov
- Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation, Table B-1, September 2026 bls.gov
- FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: manufacturing employees (MANEMP) fred.stlouisfed.org
- FRED: industrial production, manufacturing (IPMAN), from the Federal Reserve Board fred.stlouisfed.org
- UN Industrial Development Organization, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2024 unido.org
- 1–2. The Goal And The Cause
- Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization (G.17), October 2026 federalreserve.gov
- Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity and Costs by Industry: Manufacturing, March 2026 bls.gov
- Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price, “Import Competition and the Great U.S. Employment Sag of the 2000s,” NBER Working Paper 20395 nber.org
- NBER Digest, “Import Competition and the Great U.S. Employment Sag,” December 2014 nber.org
- 3. Seen And Unseen: Tariffs
- U.S. International Trade Commission, economic impact of Section 232 and 301 tariffs, news release, March 2023 usitc.gov
- U.S. International Trade Commission, Publication 5405 (full report) usitc.gov
- Flaaen and Pierce, “Disentangling the Effects of the 2018–2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector,” Federal Reserve Board federalreserve.gov
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, “Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?” February 2026 libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org
- Federal Reserve Board, FEDS Notes, “Detecting Tariff Effects on Consumer Prices in Real Time, Part II,” April 2026 federalreserve.gov
- Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation, September 2026 bls.gov
- 4. Inputs
- U.S. Census Bureau, Annual 2025 trade press highlights census.gov
- U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies, “An Anatomy of U.S. Establishments’ Trade Linkages,” CES-WP-25-44 www2.census.gov
- 5. Responses, Deficits, And The Law
- Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, “Tallying the two channels of job losses from tariffs,” 2025 minneapolisfed.org
- Congressional Research Service, “The Trade Deficit” (IF10619) congress.gov
- Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December and Annual 2025 bea.gov
- Supreme Court of the United States, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287, Feb. 20, 2026 supremecourt.gov
- Congressional Research Service, U.S. tariff actions in 2026 (R49481) congress.gov
- The Strongest Case: Chips
- Congressional Research Service, “Taiwan’s Role in Global Semiconductor Supply Chains” (IG10073) congress.gov
- Congressional Research Service, “Semiconductors and the CHIPS Act: The Global Context” (R47558) congress.gov
- What Can Government Do? And Fair Challenges
- U.S. Department of Labor, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (termination notice) dol.gov
- Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover, August 2026 bls.gov
- Congressional Research Service, “Infant Formula Shortage: FDA Regulation and Federal Response” (IF12123) congress.gov
- Congressional Research Service, “Tariffs and the Infant Formula Shortage” (IN11932) everycrsreport.com
- Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Section 301 Investigation Fact Sheet, June 2018 ustr.gov
- Richard Fulmer, “Condemning the Profit Motive: Part 4,” Econlib, 2023 econlib.org
- Federal Reserve Board, FEDS working paper 2026-035 (distribution of the tariff burden) federalreserve.gov
- Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation, Table B-3 (average hourly earnings), September 2026 bls.gov
- Videos (Marginal Revolution University, YouTube)
- Alex Tabarrok, “Tariffs and Protectionism” youtube.com
- Alex Tabarrok, “Arguments Against International Trade” youtube.com
- The China Shock Debate
- Kirill Borusyak, Peter Hull, and Xavier Jaravel, “Quasi-Experimental Shift-Share Research Designs,” Review of Economic Studies 89, no. 1 (2022) arxiv.org
- David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, “On the Persistence of the China Shock,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2021 (NBER Working Paper 29401) nber.org
- Joseph Francis, “Whimsy and Fragility in the ‘China Shock’ Narrative,” Econ Journal Watch 23, no. 2 (September 2026) econjwatch.org
- Podcasts (Econtalk, Library Of Economics And Liberty, With Transcripts)
- EconTalk, “The Economics of Tariffs and Trade (with Doug Irwin),” hosted by Russ Roberts, May 5, 2025 econtalk.org
- EconTalk, “Why Industrial Policy Is (Almost) Always a Bad Idea (with Scott Sumner),” hosted by Russ Roberts, December 9, 2024 econtalk.org
- EconTalk, “How Did America Build the Arsenal of Democracy? (with Brian Potter),” hosted by Russ Roberts, September 15, 2025 econtalk.org
- EconTalk, “Revisiting the China Shock (with Joseph Francis),” hosted by Russ Roberts, November 2, 2026 econtalk.org